In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development

This final chapter focuses on attachment and separation and how they have traditionally been positioned in theories of human development. While the two are seen as “reiterative counterpoints” throughout human lives, in theories of development separation is privileged.

Gilligan cites psychologist Daniel Levinson’s theory of development, in which relationships such as the “mentor” and the “special woman” enable the (male) hero to achieve success. These are merely “transitional figures” who are no longer relevant once success is achieved. George Vaillant’s work also focuses on individual achievement through the lens of work. He seeks to provide more clarity for what he views as the nebulous decades of a person’s 20s through 40s in Erikson’s theory of development.

While the reality of separation is recognized in theories of human development, the reality of continuing connection is neglected, pushed to the background where women are also relegated. Such a forced recession of connection, however, distorts the “dialogue” of individuation and connection that contains “the dialectic that creates the tension of human development” (156).

Gilligan continues to theorize how construction of identity, whether through self-expression or self-sacrifice, creates “problems” in human development. In the first case, there is a “problem of human connection,” and in the second, a “problem of truth” (157). It is only in the dialectic—the tension of the two in relation to one another—that full moral development is possible.

Gilligan references her interviews with both men and women to explore these different constructions, concluding that “the dilemma is the same for both sexes, a conflict between integrity and care” (164). This shared dilemma, however, is approached from “different perspectives,” generating “the recognition of opposite truths” (164). These two opposing yet related truths are reflected in “two different moral ideologies” (164), one where separation is “justified by an ethic of rights” (164) and another where the connection is “supported by an ethic of care” (164). This “morality of rights” is based on equality and a notion of fairness, while the “ethic of responsibility” is centered on equity, with a recognition of differences in vulnerability.

Gilligan walks through the ways that women come to realize that an injunction against emotionally hurting others is not possible, which she began to explore in Chapter 5. In her interviews with college-age students, she locates how both men and women move away from absolutes, but the absolutes from which they distance themselves are different. For women the absolute of care, defined by some women as not hurting others, is recognized as impossible within the need for personal integrity. This recognition of the impossibility of never causing harm of any kind then gives way to a recognition of the need for rights, which changes how care is conceived. For men, the abstract notions of equality and fairness are challenged by experiences of differences. This leads to a relativizing of the notion of equality and a movement toward equity, organically creating an ethic of care. The existences of these two contexts lead to new engagements with both integrity and care.

Gilligan also suggests that women orient themselves differently toward power. Women’s fantasies of power are generally those of relational care. Men’s fantasies of power are generally of assertion and aggression. Jean Baker Miller argues that women are well-situated to understand power relations. Miller distinguishes between power relations: Those grounded in temporary inequality “assume a moral dimension” (168), such as the relation between parent and child or teacher and student, in which power is used to “foster the development that removes the initial disparity” (168). When power is used to maintain inequality permanently, however, this is oppression. Miller argues that women are grounded in moral relations of power (with their children) and in immoral relations of power (with men). Thus, women are in a position to observe and also experience both the moral and immoral dimensions of power within the nuclear family.

This perspective informs the work of Carol Stack and Lillian Rubin. Stack investigates poor Black families, and Rubin investigates poor white families. Both researchers find new definitions of family and an order that, from the outside, appears to be chaotic.

Gilligan turns to Piaget’s theory of child moral development, in which he articulates three stages of development, with constraint turning to cooperation, which evolves into generosity. Piaget finds that children learn the rules of the game, exercising restraint, and the morality of restraint organically becomes the morality of cooperation. Piaget also notes how, in this process, children come to deal with differences, and justice and love come together in an ethic of generosity.

An ethic of justice proceeds from a desire for equality (i.e., everyone should receive the same treatment), while an ethic of care proceeds from a desire for nonviolence (i.e., no one should be hurt). Gilligan argues that “this dialogue between fairness and care not only provides a better understanding of relations between the sexes but also gives rise to a more comprehensive portrayal of adult work and family relationships” (174).

Gilligan ends by referencing Piaget’s and Freud’s works on child development and the ways that their theories of child development have resulted in greater attention being paid to the difference in children’s thinking. She hopes that her work can similarly draw attention to another difference—that of women’s thinking about morality.